

# Queer Vampiric Desire

## Bisexuality on Body without Organs

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### Abstract

The article ponders on the theoretical quandaries of bisexuality through an exploration of identity and desire that does not attach to Western epistemologies of identity politics or selfhood. The overarching aim is to seek the queerness of bisexuality, which is framed through vampirism. I argue that queerness understood through Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of Body without Organs and desiring machines enables the manifestation of bisexual, vampiric desires that are uninhibited by psychoanalytical repression. Transgressive and monstrous representations of vampires construct a discursive site which enables the actualisation of queerness on the Body without Organs. I also argue that vampiric desire should be understood as a lived-possibility. Claiming the radical potential of bisexuality unfastens the bonds of eroticism and sexual desire from the policing of sexual taxonomies that frames a singular or real meaning to sexual affectivities.

Could we ask, about a concept like bisexuality that is gaining new currency, NOT so much 'What does it *really* mean?' or 'Who owns it and are they good or bad?', but 'What does it *do*?' – what does it make happen? – what (in the ways that it is being or *could* be used) does it make easier or harder for people of various kinds to accomplish and think? [my emphasis] <sup>1</sup>

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The important consideration of Sedgwick's post to QSTUDY-L is to determine what bisexuality could or could not accomplish, perform and execute. 'What does it do?' takes precedence over the multifarious interpretations that bisexual identity could *mean*. The active, emancipatory dynamism of bisexual theories and conceptualisations are prioritised over the (moral and ethical) ownership of the sexual identity. The overarching question is to do *what* and for what purpose? This article ponders the theoretical quandaries of bisexuality through an exploration of identity and desire that does not attach to Western epistemologies of identity politics or selfhood<sup>2</sup>. The overarching aim is to seek the queerness of bisexuality, which is framed through vampirism. I argue that undialectical queerness understood through Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of Body without Organs and desiring machines enables the manifestation of bisexual, vampiric desires that are uninhibited by psychoanalytical repression. Transgressive and monstrous representations of vampires construct a discursive site which enables the actualisation of vampiric desires. Claiming the radical potential of bisexuality unfastens the bonds of eroticism and sexual desire from the policing of sexual taxonomies that frames a singular or real meaning.

Sedgwick's challenge is addressed through the execution of bisexual vampiric desire, which does not confine sexual needs to male or female, heterosexual or homosexual.

I use vampires as tropes of bisexual desire unconstrained by the gender or sexuality of the subject/victim<sup>3</sup>. In the popular cultural history and imagination of the undeads, vampires are represented with irrepressible, indiscriminate and transgressive sexual appetites. They are the epitome of queer desire unhindered by biases of age, creed, religion, sexuality, gender, or class. Vampires exist only in relation to the living, to the blood that has been saturated by sexual significations that entices and repels the audience.<sup>4</sup> These creatures, with an insuppressible urge to feed, are formed by our cultural imagination to, at once, warn of the dangers and horrors of unrepressed sexual lust and at the same time open the floodgates to representations of sexual freedom.

The apotheosis of vampiric (sexual) desire is framed in and through a Deleuze and Guattarian philosophy of Body without Organs (BwOs) and desiring-machines. To affirm vampiric desire, the study of the vampire must not invoke identity politics that rigidly frames the affectivities of the monstrous subject. Part of the reason to summon the Body without Organs is due to its antagonistic stance against any structured form or rigid organisation of desires, oppressions and prejudices of the sexual self. Identity politics are enemies of BwOs because the rigidity and labelling of desires affirms the power of organisms, which are 'forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchised organisations' that stops and coagulates desire.<sup>5</sup> Identity politics, as criticised by poststructuralism, studies the self as a coherent whole, unified by labels and classifications of an individual's experiences.<sup>6</sup> The valorisation of 'stable' sexual subjects cannot affirm the multiplicities or shifting states of affectivities. Jan Clausen once argued that identity politics attacks the movement of desire because her transition from lesbian to bisexual was condemned as a traitorous disavowal of lesbian activism and solidarity.<sup>7</sup> It was her inimical position within identity politics that pushed Clausen to state that 'bisexuality is not a sexual identity at all, but a sort of anti-identity, a refusal ... to be limited to one object of desire'.<sup>8</sup> I do not dismiss identities as inconsequential, but argue that vampiric desire removes the limitations of identity politics through the constant avowal for multiplicities of sexual desire that shifts and transforms according to the flow of passions. Vampiric desire on the Body without Organs asserts that the connections between bodies and ardour should not be limited by any classification of affectivities but rather move uninhibited on, between and across sexual bodies.

Vampires must exist in relation to other vampires, to other human beings, and to socio-discursive structures that sustains both living and undead. The pleasurable and erotic relationships that transcend both life and death are only possible because each vampire both affects and is affected through a connection with other bodies – constantly transforming, never stagnate to an immutable identity. Vampiric desires are what Deleuze and Guattari calls the *desiring-machines* of the BwOs.

Vampires are metonymic of desiring machines. This abstract mechanism is 'a system of interruptions or breaks' that produces desire through repetition.<sup>9</sup>

The best example provided by Deleuze and Guattari is the portrait of a young child who is plugged into machines that helps animate the functions of his organs. Bruno Bettelheim's posthuman child is incapable of eating, sleeping, defecating and, in general living, unless he is connected to mechanical apparatuses. The dysfunctional body of the boy is, on its own terms, incapable of the production of life. The unplugged child is the Body without Organs with 'eyes closed tight, nostrils pinched shut, ears stopped up'.<sup>10</sup> It is for this reason that BwOs are antiproduktive; Body without Organs cannot produce because they actualise a plane of intensities (beginning from zero) and only desiring-machines (such as the motors, wires, lights and propellers) allow for the production of desires.<sup>11</sup> It is precisely because BwOs cannot produce that paradoxically incites the creation and mobilisation of desire (the wish to see, to breathe, to hear). Only through the productive processes of desiring-machines on the Body without Organs 'that diverts and frustrates the entire process of [normal] production' could the posthuman child be more than human, more than what 'normal', biological faculties permit.<sup>12</sup> Vampires, like the posthuman child, are desiring-machines. The need and desire to satiate the hunger of the senses (to see, to hear, to breathe, to feed) activates libidinous production. The radical production of ardour and passion can only be accomplished if the monstrous, vampiric subject ends the subject/victim's repression of affectivities.

Desiring machines are systems of rupture and break that destabilises any normative configuration of affectivities. The power of the vampire is not only located in representation but must also be understood and acknowledged as a lived possibility. These vampires are not homosexual or heterosexual, but when combined with both textures of desire, they are queer, bisexual beings. I have enfolded bisexuality into the site of vampirism because I perceive bisexual libido as a potent reconfiguration of affectivities that are not bifurcated into homo or hetero desires. Bisexuality is invoked as queerly disruptive – as desiring-machines – because of his/her/its position in-between sexual, discursive structures. Bisexuality as desiring-machines must be connected to Body without Organs because BwOs incite the production of passions and arduors on a plane of intensities. To understand this positioning of sexual subjectivity, it is necessary to first elucidate the positive and transgressive production of desire. The repudiation of the Oedipal complex and Lacanian lack facilitates the theoretical and philosophical composition of queer, vampiric bisexuals.

### ***The production of queer vampiric desire***

Desire is an ocean of possibilities; it ebbs and returns to the body, constantly flowing between subjects and objects, always connecting one being to another. This flux and transformative power is at once liberatory and dangerous; the complexity and paradoxical nature of affectivities has thus been the subject of debate and interrogation in Western philosophy since the conceptualisation of eros and Platonic desire for knowledge and beauty.<sup>13</sup>

Hegel (and later Lacan) shared a belief that desire negates its object, whereby the lack of desire must be constantly fulfilled but in the satiation of the subject's needs the object loses its value.<sup>14</sup> Thus 'the desiring subject no longer desires what it has, once possessed, the object loses its very desirability'.<sup>15</sup> It is

the insatiability of lack and negativity that Hegelian subjects are constantly driven by the need for self-knowledge and through the process of dialectics achieve an apodictic, Absolute Knowledge. The Lacanian lack stems from the unconscious and it is rooted in the repressed, Oedipal phase of sexuality. Desire is always the desire for the Other (the Woman), for the symbolic phallus, and always an unfulfillable drive of the unconscious.<sup>16</sup> By positing the flow of affectivities as a negative phenomenon – a constant insufficiency and deficiency – we lose sight of desire as a positive production that is constantly enfolding and spreading across the expanding field of sexualities. In Lacan's seminal work on sexuality<sup>17</sup>, I acknowledge his insistence to place desire outside the symbolic Law of the Father, thus inscribing libido with a transgressiveness that exceeds the limits of the Law, constructing the space of unhindered expression. Desire exceeds Freud's 'pleasure principle', which seeks and goes beyond the limits of pleasure. The problem with this formulation is that we can never achieve that which we aspire. Since the unconscious is ambivalently located outside of any law, we can never truly grasp its otherness. A circuitous and redundancy of desire is performed. According to Lacan, we are always looking for the other and never finding the opposite of Self; the split subject is constructed when 'what he desires presents itself to him as what he does not want'.<sup>18</sup> It is this failure to recognise the object of passion – the failure of fulfilment – that paradoxically allows the self to access *jouissance*, which 'contains within all the senses of extreme pleasure and enjoyment a negativity that stems from the transgression of moral structures'.<sup>19</sup> Feminist critics of Lacanian desire such as Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous have often confronted male dominated inscriptions of sexual eroticism and masculine determinations of *jouissance*. As Patrick Fuery notes, French feminism expressed 'the desire to desire their own writing' thus enabling sexual difference to permeate the phallic economy.<sup>20</sup> If Freud/Lacanian *jouissance* is feminine desire of The Woman that phallogocentrism cannot contain or understand, then Irigaray suggests that we do away with psychoanalysis. Feminine affectivities cannot be apprehended through the sexist models of the Oedipal triangle that asphyxiates the performance of women's speech and politics.<sup>21</sup> Following this path of critique, I advance an anti-Oedipal investigation of bisexual, vampiric desire that does not succumb to lack and negativity. Freudian and Lacanian interpretations must not dominate the learning of the unconscious because the multiplicity of affectivities does not merely surrender to the symbolic function of 'daddy-mummy-me' – the tripartite model of the Oedipus. Bisexual vampirism negotiates the positive affirmation of unconscious desires and productive affectivities.

To explicate further the positive production of desire, Deleuze and Guattari sought to dismantle the Oedipal formula of 3+1. Three is the signifier of the father, the mother and the child (daddy-mummy-me) and One is the transcendental signifier of the Phallus without which the tripartite formation of psychoanalysis cannot be sustained. Anti-Oedipal theory is oppositional to any lack or negativity because the unconscious is primarily filled with ignorance. To repudiate psychoanalysis, the authors must make the inference that the unconscious 'knows nothing of castration or Oedipus, just as it knows nothing of parents, gods, the law, lack'.<sup>22</sup> Because ignorance is not simply 'not knowing' but a selective process of knowledge construction, the subject is only

castrated when the unconscious acknowledges its lack. It is the self-affirmation of negative desire that the Oedipal complex gains currency and power. Deleuze and Guattari note that the Women's Liberation movement was right in saying that '[w]e [sic] are not castrated, so you get fucked'.<sup>23</sup> Vampiric desire confirms feminist disavowals of the phallic economy and the denaturalisation of the masculine unconscious. Confidence in the Oedipal is facetious. Belief in negativity produces nothing; only through the active production of dissident desire can academics move beyond the faith in phallic lack, which functions like the market economy of the dominant class. The insufficiency of desire

involves deliberately organising wants and needs (*manqué*) amid an abundance of production; making all of desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one's needs satisfied; and making the object dependent upon the real production that is supposedly exterior to desire ... while at the same time desire is categorised as fantasy and nothing but fantasy.<sup>24</sup>

Michel Foucault, in his prefatory advocacy for *Anti-Oedipus*, supports the critique that the 'poor technicians of desire-psychoanalysts' suppresses the multiplicity of affectivities into a suffocating law of structure and lack.<sup>25</sup> The most damaging of contexts is when desire as lack becomes the *only* form of affectivity that creates a fascist determination of sexualities, which 'causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us'.<sup>26</sup> The fantasy that regulates the Oedipal analyses of sexuality is reliant on symbolic representations and the Imaginary. What is problematic with the constant channelling of desire to fantasies of castration, penis envy, and irrecoverable *jouissance* of the Woman is psychoanalysis' inability to fathom libido as production of affectivities in the Real, or social reality. As Deleuze and Guattari explains, 'If desire is productive, it can only be productive in the real world and can produce only reality ... Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression'.<sup>27</sup> It might at first sound contradictory that desire lacks nothing but conversely lacks a fixed subject. I read this statement as a blithe interjection into the discussion of psychoanalysis. It is the aim of the authors to acknowledge that objects of desire and desiring subjects are always constituted within socio-cultural discourses. The subject is never fixed, always moving and transforming; s/he takes and produces libido in the social world using whatever available sources to achieve the product of libido. Desire cannot lack anything if it is already constituted in the Real. I affirm Deleuze and Guattari's argument that the production of feelings – love, hate, lust, anger, amour, or abhorrence – is contingent upon objective existence, which means that desire follows the path of reality, of socio-cultural discourses, of historical materialism that determines the contexts of affectivities. Vampiric desire is explicated through representative tropes of vampiric narratives and imagery. This does not infer that vampiric desire is to stifle within the bastions of symbolic representation. The purpose of this analysis is to construct a lived-possibility and affirmation of vampiric desire; to learn *how* to be vampires in the Real – in our everyday lives.

I have chosen bisexual identity as the embodiment of vampirism because the non-bifurcation of sexual desires between either men or women allows for non-discriminatory connections between bodies and the further production of affectivities. The libido of the queer bisexual is metonymic of the vampire: neither gender impedes on the generation of ardour, lust or love. The bisexual subject that determines vampiric desire must be radically queer because the aspiration to be monogamous or to stifle in any way the production of affectivities is counter-productive to the function of desiring-machines. Of course, criticisms against this theoretical, conceptualisation of bisexualities are well rehearsed. The charges are often levelled against queer theory's disregard for the social-materiality of sexual subjects<sup>28</sup> and the excessive, radical transformation of sexual desire that ignores specific categories of sexual expression and oppression<sup>29</sup>. I do not refute these criticisms, but it is also important to acknowledge the possibilities of radical politics, of non-monogamy, of resistive and disruptive desires that do not conform to the institutional claims on sexuality. In other words, the right and access to queerness, which allows for the explosion of bisexual affectivities that attaches and bonds with other sexual subjects without bifurcating desire to either male or female, homo- or hetero-sexual. The bisexual is vampiric.

To apprehend the radical, transformative, and positive production of bisexual desire is to penetrate the structure of bisexual identity politics; to destabilise the restructuring of homo/hetero binaries that maintains rather than denaturalises the spaces of sexual signification. The production of vampiric desire must invalidate identity politics and the never-ending conundrums of bisexual selfhood that produce the theory of bisexuality<sup>30</sup>. The Body without Organs is used strategically to organise planes of intensities that are positive, which do not succumb to the psychoanalytic lack, repression and regression of the phallogocentric, Oedipal trap.<sup>31</sup> This positivity is an important constitution of vampirism.

There is an obvious difference between homosexual and bisexual identity politics. The former delineates a strict boundary between heterosexuality and homosexuality. Gay men and lesbians are constructed as univocally different from heterosexuals because of a monistic oppression that assumes either side as absolutely antagonistic of the 'other'. Bi-identity politics sought to restructure itself in-between monosexism and thus create a third structure that is suffocatingly flanked by two warring discourses. Martin Weinberg, Colin Williams and Douglas Pryor made this point excessively clear in their qualitative analysis of bisexual identities in *Dual Attraction*<sup>32</sup>. In their chapter titled 'Becoming Bisexual', the subjects exhibit an almost obsessed anxiety over the label 'bisexual'. There is no consensus over the meaning of bisexuality. After some respondents have supposedly 'settled into an identity', the authors note that uncertainty overcomes any trope of stable meaning.<sup>33</sup> Even more disconcerting is the realisation that most bisexuals who are adversarial to sexual hegemony actually fall back on traditional gender stereotypes.<sup>34</sup> The repositioning of bisexual identities to engage within the battle-worn field of homosexual identity politics versus the (assumed) ubiquitously dominant heterosexuality is analogous to an insect in a Venus Flytrap. Sexuality is

ensnared. The bisexual is disintegrated and abrogated in its unfortunate situation within monism.<sup>35</sup>

The bisexual is framed as an excessive-compulsive consumer of sexual definitions.<sup>36</sup> The leitmotif of the bisexual quandary is understood in derogatory terms: the fence sitter, AIDS carrier, promiscuous and unable to commit to relationships, and sexually confused. The drive to debunk these inimical representations often becomes a frustrating exercise. Bisexual identity politics becomes enticing because it categorises, characterises and decodes sexual desire and pleasure. The problem occurs when identity politics cauterises the transformative potential of eroticism, of polymorphous perversity, of transgressive desire.<sup>37</sup>

Sex, as Roland Barthes suggests, 'will be taken into no typology ... whose plural will baffle any constituted, centred discourse, to the point where it seems ... virtually pointless to talk about it'.<sup>38</sup> This is the utopia of anti-identitarian identities. The advocacy of such a *jouissance* is unencumbered by a regime of homosexual and bisexual politics that constantly asks what sexual identity and/or behaviour means. It is now urgent to ask what does (bi)sexuality do and tap into the dynamic movement of an anti-Oedipal *jouissance*.<sup>39</sup> To acknowledge the radical potential of Barthes' critique is to 'release [sexuality] from meaning',<sup>40</sup> to demand that the pleasure potential of perversions must 'quite simply, *makes happy*; or to be more specific, it produces a *more*'.<sup>41</sup> Barthes thus disconnects the signifier of pleasure from its signified. Happiness making should not ask why it is happy but always insist for *more*, to produce continuous, ecstatic effects through relationships and connections with other people, regardless of sexuality or gender. Of course, this does not infer that studies of sexual and gender distinctions are to be made redundant. The purpose of bisexual vampirism is to open a transgressive, queer space that valorises a radical and non-discriminatory desire. Conversely, this exploration of desire does not infer that meaning making should be abandoned, or that erotic and passionate affectations are emptied of significations. Theorisations of sexuality must move outside the bastions of identity politics, which has plagued bisexuality with 'behavioural meaning'.<sup>42</sup> The problem with 'behavioural meaning' is its ensnarement within a chronology of sex object-choice over a period of time. This is to say that the behaviour of bisexuals is monitored over a specific time frame to taxonomise the pattern of bisexual attitudes, lifestyle and habits. Sociologists and anthropologists have repeatedly articulated that bisexuals do not display a consistency with their preferred partners because there is no sustained repetition of sexual object-choice.<sup>43</sup> Sexuality understood in terms of behaviour and identity politics endeavours to find an original, sexual typology such as the 'true' or 'real' homosexual. As Clare Hemmings notes, traditional sociological typecasting of sexual identities fail to negotiate the diversity and plurality of desires that constantly shifts the life project of an individual.<sup>44</sup> This quest to justify identity politics reifies and produces the antithesis of vampiric desire because the restricted organisation of what bisexuality means is analogous to a heated pot of brimming fluid. The subjective, hyperbolic meaning of sexual identities produces an excess of significations and interpretations that cannot be contained in identity politics and overflows with contradictions and antagonisms.

Queer bisexuality is not an integrationist formation. It does not comply or slot into heterosexual or homosexual orientations but mobilises ‘an epistemological and ethical vantage point from which we can examine and deconstruct the bipolar frameworks of gender and sexuality’.<sup>45</sup> The ‘outside’, sexual discursive position of bisexuality does not reiterate or adopt homo or hetero positioning. Instead, innovative queer spaces are offered, providing a critical edge that accentuates and destabilises identity politics. The risk in this critique is reminiscent of the criticism against queer theory. Queer, bisexual theory situates an epistemological exteriority from the material existence of sexual identities and is thus attacked for overestimating the ‘radical’, discursive potential of sexuality. An intellectual impasse is generated. One spectrum of (socio-anthropological) critique valorises for the important lived experiences of bisexual subjects, but recognises the constricting ethnomethodologies that taxonomise the subject’s ontological experiences. The other extreme of the bisexual gamut queer-ies and attacks the narrow, socio-anthropological model of empirical research. The result is a radical bisexuality that does not connect with social struggles and discursive power relations that affects the individual.<sup>46</sup> As Volkmar Sigush claimed, ‘[t]he advocates of queer studies seek to invest the unusual and the obstinately unconventional with rights, without allowing them to be captured in rigid identities. In expounding theory, however, which is impossible without defined terms, they are once again compelled to convert fluids to solids’.<sup>47</sup> The neosexual revolution is the aftermath of the 1960s and 1970s sex boom. In the ‘postmodern era’, the neosexual tries to find the symbolic power of sexuality but is confronted by the banality and ephemerality of sexual happiness.<sup>48</sup>

Through such an analytical review, it appears that a (productive) madness has pervaded the entire system of (bi)sexual theory. A schizophrenic insanity has infected academia, destroying disciplinary stratagems and critical methodologies. Constant antagonism, opposition and rivalry between ‘us’ and ‘them’ circulates within the rotting organisation – the organism despised by the BwOs. Jonathan Dollimore exacted an informed and biting critique of postmodern queerness, but also claimed indebtedness to queer theory’s removal of essentialised identities. The supposition of stable categories such as masculinity and femininity is, in his words, ‘reactionary crap’ of ‘obsolete humanism’.<sup>49</sup> Dollimore also condemned queerness for its systematic de(con)struction of desire for the sake of discursive and ideological rupture.<sup>50</sup> The consequence is the implosion of queer theory, which adversely creates a theoretical black hole that consumes its own denaturalising strategies. Queer becomes wishful theory.<sup>51</sup> Sex continues to be an excruciating, dialectical field of intellectual inquiry. To affirm radical queerness, this dialectical tension must be removed.<sup>52</sup> Bisexual vampirism summons the full force of queer desire and provokes the rethinking of sexuality through transgression and dissidence. The actualisation of vampiric desires on Body without Organs can only occur when the strata of organisms (identity politics and contradictory sexual theories) no longer impede on the multiplicities of sexual contact. Queer theorists are the vigilantes of sexual organisms (organisations that impede on sexual expression) while BwOs actualises desire that allows for the production of incommensurable connections of erotic pleasures. I use queer here as a theoretical and strategic device that helps produce bisexual, vampiric desires on



Body without Organs. This process is initiated through the appreciation of vampiric death, which begins the production of vampiric affectivities.

To understand vampiric desires, the death-drive of the undead must first be explained. Death for the vampire is not the antithesis of living. Through the act of blood-sucking that ‘turns’ living beings into undeads, the vampire creates amorous and desire-producing subjects. The death-drive does not end desire but on the contrary produces even more vampires – desiring-machines – that proliferate the entire BwOs with affectivities. Leo Bersani, whose work complements a Deleuze and Guattarian philosophy of BwOs, explains the desiring-production of vampires succinctly:

[s]ame sex desire, while it excludes the other sex as its object, presupposes a desiring subject for whom *the antagonism between the different and the same no longer exist* ... I am speaking ... not of a mysteriously predetermined and permanently fixed orientation, but of the inevitable, unpredictable, and variable process by which desire becomes *attached* to persons [my emphasis].<sup>53</sup>

Homo-ness for Bersani is not limited to only homosexual sex, although he uses same-sex desires as the focus of his theoretical exploration of self-shattering affectations. Homo-ness can accommodate bisexual desire as a ‘form of ... passion that resists the complacency of norms, consensus, and ultimately society’.<sup>54</sup> This queerly dissident desire can only be activated and propagated when ‘desire become *attached* to persons’.<sup>55</sup> This physical connection between desiring-vampires and desired-human subjects are enabled by the death-drive that stimulates an unconscious compulsion to produce more undeads. Vampiric desire, like homo-ness, should not be understood as producing a violence that activates a negative death-drive.<sup>56</sup> The phrase ‘negative death drive’ denotes the compulsive attraction to, and destruction of, a subject’s capacity to produce affectivities. The conceptual and theoretical connection between Bersani and Deleuze and Guattari becomes clear when both denounce the psychoanalytic death of the subject as precondition to *jouissance*. It is argued in *Homos* that psychoanalysis should challenge rather than succumb to the suicidal disappearance of the subject, or in other terms, ‘to disassociate masochism from the death-drive’.<sup>57</sup> Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of the death-drive is slightly different. They state that the Body without Organs is death in itself. This death is constituent of *becoming* – of connecting and deterritorialising desires, of using and understanding ‘repression’ as a positive force rather than a Lacanian lack.<sup>58</sup> ‘Repression’ as death is thus understood in terms of positive production of desire:

The experience of death is the most common of occurrences in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs *in life and for life*, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as a passage of becoming ... Every intensity controls within its own life the experience of death and envelopes it ... Death, then, does actually happen. [My emphasis]<sup>59</sup>

Death is an intensity of desire on the plane of immanence. It propels and stimulates desiring-machines on the Body without Organs to produce more BwOs.<sup>60</sup> Repetitive acts are therefore the proto-mechanisms of vampiric desire

– such as the blood feeding frenzy, which must be continually repeated to sustain the intensity of vampiric death. The masochism of vampiric ‘victims’ must not be understood as a form of death-seeking experience that announces a finality of life, of affectations, and intensities. The Law of Pleasure explained by Laurence A. Rickley is the reversal of Freudian phallogocentricism, which declares the superego (law, conscience, morality) as sadistic while the masochist (you, I, body and ego) derives pleasure from the death of the superego – the transgression of desires.<sup>61</sup> Explicitly asserted in anti-Oedipal terms of desire, violence and lack in selfhood do not pose as an impediment to the production of planes of intensities. The masochist (subjects of vampiric desire) does not surrender to the negative death-drive – the death of the subject – but rather intensifies erotic pleasure through a *becoming* death that connects with vampiric desire on the Body without Organs. The fundamental principle of vampiric desire presupposes that the subject must *want* to be an undead to exist on a plane of intensities. The permanence of death is only actualised when the subject disassociates and renounces desire.

### ***Body Search: Locating Vampiric Desire***

How do we detect and determine the position of bisexual, vampiric desire? Specific nodes and signifiers frame and map the architecture of BwOs’ desiring-machine. This section explores the question through cinematic (con)figurations of bisexual, vampiric, embodied subjects. The representative potency of Western cinema has produced over 600 vampire movies since 1897.<sup>62</sup> Roxana Stuart observes that vampires appeared on film ‘almost as soon as the motion picture was invented’.<sup>63</sup> It is almost impossible to speak about vampirism unless popular culture is invoked. Bram Stoker/Francis Ford Coppola’s *Dracula* (1992) and Anne Rice/Neil Jordan’s *Interview with the Vampire: The Vampire Chronicles* (1994) would be of specific interest, although the former would be given added attention as it has attracted more popular and academic debates. It is in the interstices of contentions and reflections on vampiric desire that allows for a re-imagination of a bloody plane of intensities – blood as the erotic and transgressive signifier that simultaneously produces and sustains desiring-machines. Let me first further explain the characteristic of BwOs to initiate the production of vampiric desire.



The Body without Organs is initially bare of ardour, of affectations, and deterritorialising capacities. It is ‘an empty totality that organises the world without participating in it’.<sup>64</sup> This ‘empty totality’ is like a face, but a blank surface without intensities or productive effects. The only property of BwOs is in its ability to express but not actualise ‘multiplicity of fusions, fusionability as infinite zero, the plane of consistency’.<sup>65</sup> To stimulate BwOs so that the process of desiring-production occurs, desiring-machines must already be present. These desiring-machines on the plane of immanence are bisexual vampires. Bisexuality is vampiric insofar as it is not determined and defined through an inimical selfhood that organises the affectations of the embodied individual. That is to say that selfhood is a debilitating organism that presumes a person as an ‘organised and integrated being’.<sup>66</sup> Organisms are the enemies of BwOs because they stratify and subjectify desire, sex and pleasure. As Mariam Fraser reminds us, bisexuality ‘is not fused to the self ... but is rather a mobile assemblage which ... is neither mediated by a single subjectivity nor necessarily subject to the disciplinary processes of individualisation’.<sup>67</sup> Selfhood abrogates the *potentiality* of connective desires when bisexuality is understood as ‘narrative identity’, which means there is a presupposition of a ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ to ontology.<sup>68</sup> To exit the limitations set by selfhood, desire must be free to connect vampirically – rhizomatically<sup>69</sup> – with other sexes, with other desiring-machines.

To remove the Oedipal trap of castration that defends the Law of the Father, Deleuze and Guattari explain that desiring-machines that inhabit the BwOs can only work when they breakdown or are in the process of breaking-down.<sup>70</sup> BwOs and desiring-machines combine to masterfully dissolve Freudian/Lacanian phallogocentricism, thus annulling the inhibition of desire. Castration, as Philip Goodchild explains, affirms that ‘the withdrawn one who possess[es] the phallus is the father, and it is the law of the father in the oedipal phase that both constitutes and yet prevents access to desire’.<sup>71</sup> Deleuze and Guattari’s irritation with Lacanian psychoanalysis is precisely directed at the lofty perch of the symbolic phallus and the constant lack that functions to

oppress rather than liberate sexuality. Dracula is the best exemplar of an anti-Oedipal attack of castration on the BwOs.

The Count cannot be simply relegated to a specific gender – man – and the twin fangs he possesses seen as phallic symbols doubled in potency and masculine force. The shifting and transformative powers of the Count enable ‘him’/it to metamorphosize into animals – bats and wolves – and also into intangibility – mist. A closer reading of vampiric sexuality would destabilise the erroneous assumption that only desire in human corporeality could be actualised. Jalal Toufic astutely remarked that when vampires feed and ‘make love’ to their ‘victims’, they also embody the essence of a bat or a wolf. A zoophilic sexuality is engaged during sex and challenges the assumed human/gendered corporeality of vampires.<sup>72</sup> This queer desire is clearly evident in *Interview with the Vampire*, when Louis fed on rats and refused human blood. Freudian transference of desire to a zoophilic frenzy is not satisfying. As Louis in *Interview With The Vampire* explained poetically, ‘[I]n my mind ... the killing of anything less than a human being brought nothing but a vague longing, the discontent which had brought me close to humans, to watch their lives through glass. I was no vampire’.<sup>73</sup> The sublimation and transference of bestial desire to humans is a denigrating practice of desire because sublimation, as a psychoanalytical lack, is another adversary of BwOs. It produces a subject that longs for sexual contact but never productively engages with desire. As Louis at once admonished and warned of the undesirable characteristics of an undead: ‘I was sinking into the darkness. I was weary of longing’.<sup>74</sup> Vampires, of course, do not sink too deep in melancholy even though they experience it often. The superego, as Rickley suggested, is merely the sadist cruelly taunting the masochistic ego to derive an unfathomable pleasure from the death of morality/conscience. Louis had to learn to embrace his/its masochistic, anti-Oedipal death-drive.

Traditionally, *Dracula* is analysed using Freudian psychoanalysis, especially the phallic penetrations/rape of women, and the Law of the Father as personified by the Count. The reading of *Dracula* posits the Count as the alpha male of the narrative, hording and ‘turning’ asexual and ‘pure’ women into sexualised, voluptuous vixens.<sup>75</sup> The problem with a psychoanalytical interpretation of *Dracula* positions Mina and Lucy as mothers of Jonathan Harker, which enacts a brotherhood fighting to reclaim the ‘purity’ and infallibility of motherhood from the deviant and despised father. The mother must at once be (paradoxically) a sexual taboo to her sons but a sexual rivalry with the father. It is for this reason that Mina and Lucy are always represented as chaste and uncorrupted until, for example, Dracula bites Lucy and she suddenly becomes ‘voluptuous’ while on the verge of becoming an undead. The purpose of vampiric desire is to ‘turn’ everyone into vampires, to exact a vengeance against the over-rehearsed Oedipal ensnarement of unconscious, sexual repression. There is no need for sublimation and there is no need for projection – the denial that we do not want (to be) vampires. We must allow vampires to seduce us, to kill us, to infect the moral being in us.<sup>76</sup>

James Twitchell analysed *Dracula* through a progressive, mythological model of vampiric narratives and called it the ‘vampire myth’.<sup>77</sup> He argues that

the ‘myth is loaded with sexual excitement but there is no sexuality. It is sex without genitalia, sex without confusion, sex without responsibility, sex without guilt, sex without love – better yet, sex without mention’.<sup>78</sup> The television series *Buffy and Angel* would testify that both fangs and genitalia work dependently. There is sex with guilt and there is sex with responsibility, but only to feed the sexual intensity of the masochist. Guilt and moral responsibilities are not impediments to the production of desire, but rather fuel a masochistic hunger for more blood, more bodies and more satiation of affectivities. The problem with the vampire myth is its disablement of vampiric desire as a lived possibility. Desire is debased to a phantasmatic illusion or a Platonic simulacra that mimetically reproduces vampire narratives but offers nothing new.<sup>79</sup> Deleuze and Guattari’s reversal of the Platonic simulacra states that the ‘best weapon against the simulacrum is not to unmask it as a false copy, but to force it to be a true copy ... the corporation that built the rebellious replicants introduces a new version’.<sup>80</sup> In effect, the lived possibilities of vampiric desires are not negotiated only as representation but a working, productive, desiring-machine. There is no distinction between the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary’. Both attempt to harmonise and become working parts in the same queer machine that proliferates the entire plane of intensities with blood.

The red-copper fluid that runs through our veins is a source of vitality and sustenance that feeds a dark and enigmatic desire. The connotations of darkness are mysterious, secretive, deviant, fearsome, unholy, and most importantly, sexual. Blood, as Francis Ford Coppola explains, is ‘the symbol of human passion, the source of all passion ... Blood is the primary metaphor’.<sup>81</sup> Christopher Lee made a similar remark that the sexual masochist is like a sexual donor because of a ‘response to the demand to give oneself, and what greater evidence of giving is there than your blood flowing literally from your own bloodstream? It’s the complete abandonment’.<sup>82</sup> The abandonment to vampiric desire is a necessity before the BwOs could be made productive. Blood must flood the plane of intensities because it is sexual and desirable. Lestat does not differentiate his lovers/victims as either male or female because for a vampire, gender holds no special place and meaning. It is only in doing that matters for the undead, and that is the purpose of sucking blood, of actualising the sexual frenzy of eroticism. The new sexuality as Marjorie Garber hopes for is ‘bisexuality as eroticism, “unpigeonholed sexual identity”, *not* bisexuality as the “third” choice between, or beyond, hetero- or homosex’.<sup>83</sup> Such a bisexual identity must be vampiric. The ‘eroticism of everyday life’ is possible in vampiric desire if we denounce the strata of organisms that impede on pleasure production. Thus a ‘Van Helsing’ organism (vampire killer-machine) must be deterritorialised to eliminate objections and obstructions to the multiplicities of eroticism – the plateaus of intensities.

Two specific tropes of organisms – sexologists of the past and legal doctrines of the present – have tried to demonise and characterise the sexually perverse. As Foucault observed, perverse sexuality was ‘implanted in bodies, slipped beneath the modes of conduct, made into a principle of classification and intelligibility, established as a *raison d’etre* and a natural order of disorder’.<sup>84</sup> The monstrous, sexual appetite of the vampire is feared and a scientific and legal order is imposed to curb the salaciousness and disorder of

the sexual aberrant. The organisms and enemies of BwOs need to name the 'other', to set apart the anomaly from 'decent', 'God-fearing' individuals. This is most explicit in bi-lesbian desires that have punctuated the history of vampire films. Women are without penetrative organs yet in vampire narratives they pose a serious threat to the patriarchal institution. The reason is obvious: women are able to infiltrate and even rape patriarchy. The *vagina dentata* is the panic-inducing orifice for she is now able to attack men with her mouth. Known as the 'vagina with teeth, the penetrating woman', she resembles Jean Rollin's lesbian vampire 'with spikes protruding from her breasts'.<sup>85</sup> Psychoanalysis and its attendant Oedipal complex are now being challenged through queering, cinematic strategies. If *vagina dentata* is found in the predatorial mouth of vampires, then Dracula is not exempt from scrutiny. Marie Mulvey-Roberts made a compelling argument that bleeding and breeding (the repetitive production of desiring-machines) are functions of both women and vampires.<sup>86</sup> Dracula is thus a hybrid of both male and female traits, which consequently destabilises the omnipresent Father as an unchallengeable male, masculine symbol. The difference of menstruation between women and vampires is that the latter sucks and retains blood. This is not to say, however, that vampires do not also give their sexualised blood, but only under certain conditions. The further production of vampiric desire can only be accomplished through connectivity with another 'host', or another *becoming* desiring-machine. The famous scene in Bram Stoker's novel shows Dracula slitting open his breast to force Mina Harker to drink his blood:

With his left hand he held both Mrs. Harker's hands, keeping them away with her arms at full tension; his right hand gripped her by the back of the neck, forcing her face down on his bosom. Her nightdress was smeared with blood, and a thin stream trickled down the man's bare chest which was shown by his torn-open dress. The attitude of the two had a terrible resemblance to a child forcing a kitten's nose into a saucer of milk to compel it to drink.<sup>87</sup>

A sadomasochistic tension is evident in this scene of violence and sex. This particular act between Mrs. Harker and Dracula cannot be simply read off as normative heterosexuality. If the invasion of vampiric desire produces 'offsprings' or 'children' of the undead, then this scene is a queer enactment of an incestuous relationship. Incest is clearly portrayed in *Interview with the Vampire* when Louis first sucked the blood of Claudia (played by Kirsten Dunst) and, initially, left her to die. But Lestat, hoping to rekindle the fraught relationship with Louis, made Claudia their vampire daughter. When her vampiric desires began to mature, an erotic tension and play between Claudia and Louis littered the film. She often called him my 'father', my 'Louis', and most suggestively, my 'dark-knight'. In both *Dracula* and *Interview with the Vampire*, only affairs between vampires and vampires-to-be are sexualised. Therefore, both narratives 'made sexuality seem unthinkable in "normal relations" between the sexes'.<sup>88</sup> Another noted scene in *Dracula* proves that 'normal sexuality' is non-desirable. Jonathan Harker wanders the castle hoping to prove his suspicion that the Count is not what he seems. He accidentally stumbles into the enclave of three lamias who quickly attacked him. They savoured the moment to drink his blood, to 'kiss' him. As one vampire explained, 'He is young and strong; there are kisses for us all'.<sup>89</sup> Jonathan

Harker, up to this point of the narrative, has been a good Christian, a devoted husband, and non-sexual. But when three, lascivious female vampires seduced him, he said: 'I felt in my heart a wicked, burning desire that they would kiss me with those red lips'.<sup>90</sup> This scene remarkably demonstrates that only at the point of turning into a desiring-machine are subjects eroticised. Dracula, of course, was hungry for Jonathan but not merely to satiate his blood lust. Bram Stoker was bisexual, but he had to repress his desire for men due to the socio-cultural constraints of his time.<sup>91</sup> Dracula was modelled on Henry Irving, as it was suggested that Stoker was enamoured with the actor.<sup>92</sup> When Dracula entered the room where Jonathan was held hostage, he was both livid with anger and jealousy, crying out, 'This man belongs to me!' This segment of the novel and film clearly establishes the bisexuality of Stoker and Dracula. Using the novel, Stoker relinquished the sublimation of bi-eroticism. He unleashed the productive production of sexual libido through Dracula and lamias. Queer bisexuals are to become these vampires that actualise dynamic, transgressive and radical affectivities in everyday life.

I have shown that desiring-machines and bisexual vampires inhabit the same space on the Body without Organs. The plane of immanence produces planes of intensities because there are becomings, or deterritorialisations of spaces and subjects. This deterritorialisation can only occur when a person affects another person, most obviously through sexual contact. Blood floods the plane of intensities because it is saturated with erotic significations, thus enabling the production of vampiric subjects and desires. But there are challenges to the powerful sexual nature of blood. Prostheticism and technology has been a recurring phenomenon in recent vampire films such as *Blade* (dir. Stephen Norrington, 1998) and *Underworld* (dir. Len Wiseman, 2003). Bloodsucking is no longer connected with human subjects; a bodily alienation through technology has occurred. The fear of blood is a recurring nightmare that undermines sexual fluidity. This is most evident in *Blade*, in which the protagonist is both half-vampire and half-human, possessing both the strength of vampires and the human 'soul'. As Deacon Frost (played by Stephen Dorff), the archnemesis stated: 'He has all of our strengths and none of our weaknesses'.<sup>93</sup> The most debilitating aspect of this film is not merely the disavowal of blood as sustenance and production of vampiric desires, but the negation of blood's perverse and transgressive properties. Throughout the film, Karen – the female haematologist, provides Blade with an anti-vampiric serum, which acts as a temporary prosthesis to replace his 'tainted' blood. He becomes an anaesthetised vampire who no longer feeds but uses technology to inhibit his vampiric desire. The undead is threatening because they are unequivocally evil. They are even more frightening because they 'liberate an unbridled and voracious eroticism, especially in women, whose feelings ought to be moral, not sexual'.<sup>94</sup>



This is exemplified in *Underworld*, whose central character Selene (played by Kate Beckinsale) takes blood from a blood bank. Capitalism plays a secondary role in this film as we discover that vampires own the largest and most advanced medical, research centres that produce cloned blood. Indeed, by having packets of blood in drawers, vampires lack a need to hunt, to be sexual. We now have technologised undeads like Selene who fear only bullets. She claims human ideologies such as honesty, integrity and conscience, and displays fangs that occasionally bite but only for a moral purpose.



Vampiric desires are lived possibilities but they must not be abrogated by organisms that limit the possibilities of multiple, sexual contacts. Current technologised vampire films have set the boundaries of bloodsucking. These fanged-undeads are not actively seeking the red-copper fluid of human bodies that produces desiring-machines, but they rather prefer to drink blood packs, or even worse, inhibit vampiric cravings through potent serums. Blood is an erotic signifier that holds potent meanings of transgressive pleasure and sexual gratification but it must not be limited to only meanings. The liberating potential



of bi-desire is located in the Body without Organs but must not only be interpreted or read with multiple significations. Popular culture provides a trope or method to be vampiric. It is time to be a vampire, for only then can we truly experience queer bi-sexuality.

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<sup>1</sup> Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 'Bi', Queer Studies List, <QSTUDY-L@UBVM.cc.buffalo.edu>, (17 August 1994), 15:49:34-0400.

<sup>2</sup> Mariam Fraser, *Identity Without Selfhood: Simone de Beauvoir and Bisexuality*, (Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999). Continuing Mariam Fraser's interrogation of bisexuality and selfhood, I employ the term to question identity politics and to initiate the theoretical/philosophical discussion of BwOs. Fraser notes that any examination of Beauvoir's selfhood ineluctably denies her sexual and intellectual involvement with women. Most biographical accounts of Beauvoir's life is tied to Sartre. To question identity without selfhood is to interrogate the Foucauldian technologies of selfhood, or in other words, the discursive limits that construct the narratives of identity. To understand selfhood is to first destabilise the assumption that selves are whole and rational. Following Fraser, I agree that all discussions of selfhood unadulterated by discourse, language and desire will fall into the trap of valorising organised and integrated beings. This problematically locates subjects into Enlightenment rationales of 'stable' and fixed identities with clear, teleological life projects.

<sup>3</sup> To state that the amorous subjects of vampires are victims is also to mark these subjects as preys of bisexuals. I acknowledge that it is highly problematic to refer to the sexual partner of the bisexual as victims. However the application and execution of these states and terms – uncomfortable as they may be – initiate the process of affirming queer desire. There is a fear of queer, vampiric bisexuals because the infection of bodies with vampiric desires affects a radical renegotiation and disruption of sexual morals and ethics. The victimised condition of 'normal', biphobic subjects is only amenable if s/he valorises the transgressive and dissident power of queer desire.

<sup>4</sup> Paulina Palmer, *Lesbian Gothic: Transgressive Fictions*, (London and New York, Cassell, 1999), p. 103. The genealogy of Dracula's daughters has been a particular cult favourite amongst lesbian, gothic fans. Yet the sexual identification is not without dangers towards the perversions of mother/daughter desires. The displacement of the Oedipalised taboo marks the lesbian vampire as a 'particularly terrifying creature since, in causing woman's blood to flow while also initiating her into eternal life, she reworks, with perverse displacements, the primal scene of birth'. The mother/daughter taboo is not merely a sub-form of vampiric desire used to temporarily satiate blood lust, but rather the taboos constitutes vampiric desire, which makes it so threatening and dangerous to social norms and morals.

<sup>5</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 159.

<sup>6</sup> Diana Fuss, *Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Differences*, (New York, Routledge, 1989), p. 103; and Nicola Pitchford, 'Flogging a Dead Language: Identity Politics, Sex, and the Freak Reader in Acker's Don Quixote', *Postmodern Culture* 11, no. 1, (September 2000), [http://muse.uq.edu.au.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/journals/postmodern\\_culture/v011/11.1pitchford.html](http://muse.uq.edu.au.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/journals/postmodern_culture/v011/11.1pitchford.html) (Accessed on 30/01/05).

<sup>7</sup> Jan Clausen, 'My Interesting Condition', *Out/Look: National Lesbian and Gay Quarterly* 7, Spring 1990: pp. 11-21.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

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- <sup>9</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Jane (trans.), (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 36.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37-38.
- <sup>11</sup> Another way of understanding Body without Organs is as a 'plane of immanence'. The plane of immanence is like the Internet. It is originally an abstract space, with a jumble of codes, electricity, and language that are not yet formed into coherence. The plane of immanence is a space of *potentiality*, or what Deleuze and Guattari called 'chaosmosis'. Chaos can only be articulated on the plane of immanence because the authors believe that chaos is *différence*, the element that produces differences, and as such sexuality is first a composition by chaotic formations on the abstract plane of immanence. See McKenzie Wark, 'Nettime: The Plane of Immanence', <http://www.dmc.mq.edu.au/mwark/netletters/netletter4-plane.html> (Accessed on 12/12/04).
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- <sup>13</sup> Catherine Pickstock, 'Eros and Emergence', *Telos* 127, (Spring 2004), pp. 97-118.
- <sup>14</sup> See Scott R. Stroud, 'The Historicity of the Master/Slave Dialectic in Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit*', *Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* 9, (Spring 2003), <http://www.usfca.edu/philosophy/discourse/9/stroud.pdf> (Accessed on 29/12/04).
- <sup>15</sup> Anthony O'Shea, 'Desiring Desire: How Desire makes us Human, All too Human', *Sociology* 36, no. 4, (2002), p. 926.
- <sup>16</sup> Jacques Lacan, *Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne*, Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (eds.), (New York, W.W. Norton, 1982).
- <sup>17</sup> Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, Alan Sheridan (trans.), (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986), p. 276.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 312.
- <sup>19</sup> Patrick Fuery, *Theories of Desire*, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1995), p. 32.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.
- <sup>21</sup> see Luce Irigaray, *This Sex Which Is Not One*, Carolyn Burke and Catherine Porter (trans.), (Ithaca and New York, Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 61-67.
- <sup>22</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Jane (trans.), (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 61.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* 61.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* 28.
- <sup>25</sup> Michel Foucault, 'Preface', *Anti-Oedipus*, p. xii.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xiii.
- <sup>27</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 26.
- <sup>28</sup> Arlene Stein and Ken Plummer, 'I can't even think straight: Queer theory and the missing sexual revolution in sociology', *Queer Theory/Sociology*, Steven Seidman (ed.), (Cambridge and Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p. 137-138.
- <sup>29</sup> Elizabeth Grosz, *Space, Time and Perversion*, (New York, Routledge, 1995), p. 219.
- <sup>30</sup> Fraser, *Identity Without Selfhood*, p. 10.
- <sup>31</sup> Abigail Bray and Claire Colebrook, 'The Haunted Flesh: Corporeal Feminism and the Politics of Disembodiment', *Signs* 24, no. 1, (1998), p. 39.

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<sup>32</sup> Martin Weinberg, Colin Williams and Douglas Pryor, *Dual Attraction: Understanding Bisexuality*, (New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994).

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26-38.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>35</sup> See Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz, 'Bisexuality in Men', *Urban Life* 5, (1976), pp. 339-358; and Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz 'Bisexuality: Some Social Psychological Issues', *Journal of Social Issues* 33, (1977), pp. 20-45. Almost thirty years ago, Blumstein and Schwartz made some remarkable observations on bisexual identities. On the whole, their research could be summarised as follow: 'We found no such thing as a prototypic bisexual career. This is not to say that there are no patterns to the lives of our respondents, but rather no single or small number of patterns seem to predominate among those who call themselves bisexual, or among those whose behaviour might be given that label' (p. 35). The fulcrum of their investigation follows Kinsey's idea of the sexual continuum, which they termed as 'ambisexual', or akin to the sexual. But ambisexuality marks not only the continuity and constant renegotiation of sexual identification, it also points to the ambiguity and ambivalence of the term bisexual. The paranoia of ambiguity in the definition of sexual identity produces a driving force behind the meaning making of the label, often eclipsing the priority of bisexuality, which asks what does the term *do* rather than *mean*. In other words, the question of *doing* should map the *productivity* of bisexual identity and theories.

<sup>36</sup> Moshe Shokeid, 'You Don't Eat Indian and Chinese Food at the Same Meal', *Anthropological Quarterly* 75, no. 1, (Winter 2002), pp. 63-90.

<sup>37</sup> Jonathan Alexander, 'Beyond Identity: Queer Values and Community', *Journal of Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity* 4, no. 4, (1999), pp. 293-314.

<sup>38</sup> Roland Barthes, *Roland Bathes by Roland Barthes*, Richard Howard (trans.), (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994), p. 69.

<sup>39</sup> I summon an anti-Oedipal *jouissance* that breaks the dialectics of queer versus socio-material analyses. This paper reconfigures the interrogation of sexuality and desire through the transgressive and radical potentialities of queer theory. The purpose is to investigate sexual desire as a flow of intensities that constantly connects with sexual subjects and at the same time destabilising heteronormative constructions of eroticism.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63-64.

<sup>42</sup> Clare Hemmings, 'Bisexual Theoretical Perspectives: Emergent and Contingent Relationships', *The Bisexual Imaginary: Representation, Identity and Desire*, Phoebe Davidson, Jo Eadie, Clare Hemmings, Ann Kaloski, Merl Storr (eds.), (London and Washington, Cassell, 1997), p. 18.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> Elizabeth Däumer, 'Queer Ethics, or, The Challenge of Bisexuality to Lesbian Ethics', *Hypatia* 7, no. 4, (Fall 1992), p. 98.

<sup>46</sup> Mariam Fraser, 'Lose Your Face', *Bisexual Imaginary: Representation, Identity and Desire*, Phoebe Davidson, Jo Eadie, Clare Hemmings, Ann Kaloski, Merl Storr (eds.), (London and Washington, Cassell, 1997), p. 38-39.

<sup>47</sup> Volkmar Sigush, 'The Neosexual Revolution', *Archives of Sexual Behaviour* 27, no. 4, (August 1998), p. 341.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 346.

<sup>49</sup> Jonathan Dollimore, *Sex, Literature and Censorship*, (Cambridge and Oxford, Polity Press, 2001), p. 22.

<sup>50</sup> Dollimore, *Sex, Literature and Censorship*, p. 20.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37-45.

<sup>52</sup> See Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, Paul Patton (trans.), (London, Athlone Press, 1994). Studying bisexuality through the philosophies of Deleuze and Guattari disrupts dialectical negotiations with sexual theories. Deleuze, specifically, has consistently argued against negative dialectics. Refusing an originary lack of a subject's desire, the individual is able to affirm a *becoming* desire that does not lack anything. He or she is constantly connected to the myriad of possibilities of affectivities on the plane of immanence/intensities. S/he is thus a *becoming* desiring-machine. Hegel's dialectics structures all differences into oppositions before contradictions are negotiated, reconciled, and sublated to an all-determining unity. The constant dialectical negotiations of sexual theories has shown that dialectics is at once a critical negotiation of theoretical contradictions and yet also a frustrating exercise that often circles in redundancy. Both affirmation and denigration of queer theory constructs rigid differences that negate each other and adversely dialectical theory could abrogate the emancipation of sexualities rather than productively produce differences that are not negated by antagonistic positions within dualisms. For this reason and more (in which this article cannot fully explicate), *negationless difference*, as proposed by Deleuze, aims at a diversity of singularities, such as bodies of theories or disciplines, that are not lined in opposition to other theories or singularities but rather exist asymmetrically on a plane of intensities. For further discussion of *Difference and Repetition*, see Lutz Ellrich, 'Negativity and Difference: On Gilles Deleuze's Criticism of Dialectics', *MLN* 111, no. 3, (1996), pp. 463-487; and Andrew Jones, 'Dialectics and Difference: against Harvey's dialectical "post-Marxism"', *Progress in Human Geography* 23, no. 4, (1999), pp. 529-555.

<sup>53</sup> Leo Bersani, *Homos*, (Cambridge and Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 59-60.

<sup>54</sup> Christopher Lane, 'Uncertain Terms of Pleasure', *Modern Fiction Studies* 42, no. 4, (1996), p. 810.

<sup>55</sup> Bersani, *Homos*, p. 60.

<sup>56</sup> Lane, 'Uncertain Terms of Pleasure', p. 814.

<sup>57</sup> Bersani, *Homos*, p. 99.

<sup>58</sup> Philip Goodchild, *Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire*, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1996), p. 79.

<sup>59</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 330.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7-8.

<sup>61</sup> Laurence A. Rickley, *The Vampire Lectures*, (Minneapolis and London, University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 332-334.

<sup>62</sup> Roxana Stuart, *Stage Blood: Vampires of the 19<sup>th</sup>-Century Stage*, (Bowling Green, Bowling Green State University Press, 1994), p. 217.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> Fredric Jameson, 'The End of Temporality', *Critical Inquiry* 29, no. 4, (Summer 2003), p. 713.

<sup>65</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 158.

<sup>66</sup> Elizabeth Grosz, 'A thousand tiny sexes: Feminism and rhizomatics', *Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy*, Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski (eds.), (New York, Routledge, 1994), p. 203.

<sup>67</sup> Fraser, *Identity without Selfhood*, p. 161.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> The rhizome, for Deleuze and Guattari, is anti-dialectical. Rhizomes construct a subterranean system (Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 7) that connects heterogeneously with other points of production. For example, the English language should be understood as a rhizome as there is no such

thing as a 'mother tongue'. Rather, the language is constructed and connected by multiple cultures, and disintegrates notions of 'real' or 'unreal' language. There is no location in which the language could be said to have 'begun' or 'ended'; the whole is thus heterogeneous. The rhizome is a model of multiplicities whereby the connections between, for example, vampires and their victims creates more vampires, more vampiric desire, which proliferates the entire BwOs with queer affectivities. The purpose of a rhizome is to create an anti-dialectical system that does not create polarities or dualisms within the Body without Organs but rather affirms asymmetrical and multiple productive relations between desiring-subjects.

<sup>70</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 8.

<sup>71</sup> Goodchild, *Deleuze and Guattari*, p. 79.

<sup>72</sup> Jalal Toufic, *Vampires: An Uneasy Essay on the Undead in Film*, (New York, Station Hill, 1993), p. 134.

<sup>73</sup> Anne Rice, *Interview With The Vampire*, (London, Random House, 1977), p. 28.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> Royce MacGillivray, 'Dracula: Bram Stoker's Spoiled Masterpiece', *Queen's Quarterly* 79, no. 4, (Winter 1972), p. 522.

<sup>76</sup> Phyllis A. Roth, 'Suddenly Sexual Women in Bram Stoker's *Dracula*', *Dracula: The Vampire and the Critics*, Margaret L. Carter (ed.), (Ann Arbor and London, UMI Research Press, 1988), p. 61.

<sup>77</sup> James Twitchell, 'The Vampire Myth', *Dracula: The Vampire and the Critics*, Margaret L. Carter (ed.), (Ann Arbor and London, UMI Research Press, 1988), pp. 109-116.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112.

<sup>79</sup> see Brian Massumi, 'Realer than Real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and Guattari', (Originally published in *Copyright*, 1, 1987), [http://www.anu.edu.au/HRC/first\\_and\\_last/works/realer.htm](http://www.anu.edu.au/HRC/first_and_last/works/realer.htm) (Accessed on 29/08/04).

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> cited in Stuart, *Stage Blood*, p. 217.

<sup>82</sup> cited in *Ibid.*, p. 239.

<sup>83</sup> Marjorie Garber, *Bisexuality and the Eroticism of Everyday Life*, (New York, Routledge, 2000), p. 18.

<sup>84</sup> Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality: Vol. 1*, Robert Hurley (trans.), (Hardmonsworth, Penguin, 1981), p. 44.

<sup>85</sup> Andrea Weiss, *Vampires and Violets: Lesbians in Film*, (New York and London, Penguin Books, 1992), p. 90.

<sup>86</sup> Marie Mulvey-Roberts, 'Dracula and the Doctors: Bad Blood, Menstrual Taboo and the New Woman', *Bram Stoker: History, Psychoanalysis and the Gothic*, William Hughes and Andrew Smith (eds.), (London, MacMillan Press, 1998), p. 82.

<sup>87</sup> Bram Stoker, *Dracula*, (New York, Dell, 1974), p. 313.

<sup>88</sup> Roth, 'Suddenly Sexual Women in *Dracula*', p. 59.

<sup>89</sup> Stoker, *Dracula*, p. 47.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> Mulvey-Roberts, 'Dracula and the Doctors', p. 80.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

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<sup>93</sup> Stephen Norrington (dir.) and David S. Goyer (writ.). *Blade*. 1998.

<sup>94</sup> Catherine Belsey, 'Postmodern Love: Questioning the Metaphysics of Desire', *New Literary History* 25, no. 3, (Summer 1994), p. 692.